A differential Game Related to Terrorism: Stackelberg Differential Game of E-differentiable and E-convex Function

Authors

  • Abd El-Monem Megahed

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29020/nybg.ejpam.v12i2.3375

Keywords:

Game theory, Terrorism, Stackelberg, differential game, Government Activities, E-differentiable

Keywords:

Game theory, Terrorism, Stackelberg, differential game, Government Activities, E-differentiable

Abstract

In this work, the Stackelberg differential game of $E$-differentiable and $E$ convex function is studied in order to fight the terrorism taking into account the government's procedures such as education quality, better job opportunity, social justice, religious awareness and security arrangements. We consider Stackelberg differential game. Firstly, the government is the leader and the terrorist organization is the follower. Secondly, the terrorist organization is the leader and the government is a follower. Furthermore, we apply the necessary conditions of the Stackelberg differential game for these cases to obtain the optimal strategy of this problem.

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How to Cite

Megahed, A. E.-M. (2019). A differential Game Related to Terrorism: Stackelberg Differential Game of E-differentiable and E-convex Function. European Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, 12(2), 654–667. https://doi.org/10.29020/nybg.ejpam.v12i2.3375